St. John's University School of Law

St. John's Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications
2019

Justice Jackson in the Jehovah's Witnesses' Cases
John Q. Barrett
St. John's University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Supreme Court of the
United States Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

JUSTICE JACKSON IN THE JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES’ CASES
John Q. Barrett*
I.
II.

Robert H. Jackson Before He Became Justice Jackson ..................828
Barnette in Its Supreme Court Context: The Jehovah’s Witnesses
Cases, 1938–1943 ...........................................................................831
A. The General Pattern of the Decisions: The Court Warming
to Jehovah’s Witnesses’ Constitutional Claims .......................831
1. The Pre-July 1941 Court ....................................................831
2. The July 1941–May 1943 Court ........................................833
3. The June 1943 Court ..........................................................834
B. Some Particulars of Supreme Court Personnel, Cases, and
Decisions, From Gobitis (1940) to Barnette (1943) ................834
Justice Jackson on Jehovah’s Witnesses: The Author of Barnette
Wrote First, and Significantly, in Douglas .....................................844
Conclusion: Some Life Roots of Justice Jackson’s Views on
Jehovah’s Witnesses and Others .....................................................851

III.
IV.

Thank you so much, Dean Page and Professor Wasserman, FIU faculty,
students, and fellow panelists. This is dazzling company, and it is a privilege
to be aiding, I hope, your digestion with this lunchtime lecture.
My quick comment on the morning’s panels is to voice nearly full
agreement. From one angle or another, each speaker set up very nicely one
of the two topics that I plan to address.
One is Justice Robert H. Jackson. I come to Barnette as a law professor
and also as a biographer—I am interested in the constitutional law, and also
in Justice Jackson the person. The author of the Court’s opinion in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette1 interests me at least as much
as does its law. Many of the perspectives that have been voiced here
regarding Barnette and Jackson, including comments on the decision, his
*

Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law, New York City, and Elizabeth S. Lenna Fellow,
Robert H. Jackson Center, Jamestown, New York. This publication is based on my October 5, 2018,
keynote address at Florida International University College of Law’s symposium “Barnette at 75: The
Past, Present, and Future of the ‘Fixed Star in Our Constitutional Constellation.’” Video of this program
is available at https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreviewsymposia/Barnette/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2019).
I am very grateful to Professor Howard Wasserman for organizing this excellent symposium, to
Dean Antony Page and everyone at FIU for their great planning, arrangements, and hospitality, to the FIU
Law Review editors for their work on the symposium and this publication, to the late Bennett Boskey
(1916–2016) for his friendship and guidance, and to Max D. Bartell for sharp and diligent research
assistance. Copyright © 2019 by John Q. Barrett. All rights reserved.
1

319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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opinion, doctrine, absence of doctrine, literary skill, music, prayer, and so
forth are views that I share, deeply. It is a great set-up to hear them voiced so
well.
In addition to discussing Justice Jackson, I also will address a second
topic that, to my surprise, did not come up so far in this symposium, except
implicitly or in passing. That topic is Jehovah’s Witnesses. They were the
religious believers who became litigants. They were repeat players in a run
of 1930s and 1940s United States Supreme Court cases and decisions that
included, in 1943, Barnette.
I will address Justice Jackson and Jehovah’s Witnesses in four parts.
First, I will begin with Robert Jackson himself, introducing the man who
became a Supreme Court Justice, and who came to author Barnette and at
least one other very notable opinion in a Jehovah’s Witness case. Second, I
will turn to the Barnette case in its Supreme Court legal context, which turns
out to be two Court terms, 1941–42 and 1942–43, of many Jehovah’s
Witnesses cases. These cases produced a run of Court decisions that are a
framework surrounding Barnette, and thus understanding them is important
to understanding it—Barnette was one of many decisions regarding
Jehovah’s Witnesses, not a decision standing alone. Third, I will turn back to
discussing Justice Jackson, the author of Barnette, and how his opinion there
was a piece of his judging overall in the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ cases. Finally,
I will conclude by pointing to some of Robert Jackson’s life experiences that
one can see, at least between the lines, in his Jehovah’s Witness case
opinions.
I.

ROBERT H. JACKSON BEFORE HE BECAME JUSTICE JACKSON

Robert Houghwout Jackson’s life, 1892 to 1954, was not long, but it
was full and varied—he achieved much before heart disease got the best of
him at age 62, shortly after he was part of the unanimous Supreme Court
decision in Brown v. Board of Education.2
Jackson’s life was an arc that really is the story of the rising, modern
United States. As his former law clerk Justice William Rehnquist once noted,
Jackson was a lot like Abraham Lincoln, who, born almost ninety years
earlier, also traveled from rural isolation to law, politics, high national office,
and permanent significance.3 Jackson became not only a great U.S. Supreme
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For details on Jackson’s life, see my Introduction in ROBERT H. JACKSON,
THAT MAN: AN INSIDER’S PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, at xiii–xix (John Q. Barrett, ed.,
2003).
3 See William H. Rehnquist, Robert H. Jackson: A Perspective Twenty-Five Years Later, 44 ALB.
L. REV. 533, 536 (1979–1980) (noting “Jackson’s remarkable similarity to Abraham Lincoln in many
respects. Obviously, there was only one Lincoln, and Robert Jackson did not lead the Union victoriously
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Court Justice but, two years after Barnette, a leading world figure as the chief
U.S. prosecutor of Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg. That made Jackson a
leader of the process that held top Nazis legally accountable for their crimes,
produced the record that is the basis for history’s understanding of what
Hitler’s Third Reich was and did, including the Holocaust, and built modern
international criminal and humanitarian law.
Robert Jackson ended up in those high places. He began, late in the 19th
century, on a family farm in Spring Creek Township in Warren County, in
the northwest corner of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. His greatgrandfather settled there around 1800. He built a cabin, cleared land, and
started to farm. And he had a son, who had a son, who fathered Robert H.
Jackson. (Women also were involved.)
Jackson had a rural, outdoors, hard-working, autonomous upbringing.
His parents were farm people, but Jackson’s father inclined toward the 20th
century, and so around 1898 the family moved into New York State to a
village called Frewsburg. Jackson’s father pursued ventures: he logged and
marketed wood; he bought, sold, and raced horses; he ran Frewsburg’s “Hotel
Jackson” until it burned to the ground; he had a livery stable. He also drank,
and he did not live a very long life, but perhaps he gave his son his
autonomous, entrepreneurial spirit.
Robert Jackson attended the Frewsburg school. He received knowledge
and training, including in civic values, in a small public school that was very
much like the ones that the Gobitas children and the Barnett sisters—
Jehovah’s Witnesses whose surnames, misspelled, would become part of
U.S. constitutional law—attended in the same general region.
Jackson, age seventeen, was Frewsburg High School’s valedictorian in
1909. During the next year, he commuted by rail up the valley to Jamestown,
New York, a much bigger city, where he took a second senior year at its high
school. And that was the end of his general higher education—he never
attended a day of college. Instead, at age 18, he became the apprentice in a
two-man Jamestown law firm. One was a trial lawyer. The other handled
appeals. One was a talker and a politico, the other a writer and a scholar. Each
poured his talent and style into Jackson. After a year, Jackson crossed the
state and took the second of a two-year curriculum at Albany Law School.
Then he returned to Jamestown and resumed his apprenticeship until he was
21 and could take the New York State bar examination.
Jackson began to practice in Jamestown and its region. Trying cases in
Chautauqua County court, he impressed a visiting judge from Buffalo. He
soon connected Jackson to his former law firm there.

through a Civil War which resulted in the abolition of slavery. But I am speaking now not of historical
accomplishments but of character traits.”).
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Jackson, and his new wife, then moved to Buffalo. He went to work in
the massive Ellicott Square building. He did high volume trial and appellate
work, mostly in state court, for the firm’s main client, the streetcar company.
He experienced “Big Law” circa 1917, and he became acquainted with bar
leaders and rising legal stars, including John Lord O’Brian and William J.
Donovan. Jackson, ambitious, figured out that it might take decades to
become a leading legal figure in such a big city.
So, in 1918, he returned to Jamestown. He built his law practice there,
became very active in bar associations, and through that became a legal
profession “player” in New York State and then nationally. He prospered,
becoming the father of two children, building a big house with white pillars,
owning an 80-acre horse farm, and keeping a cabin cruiser on Chautauqua
Lake. The Great Depression did not affect him much because his clients were
practical businesses that kept selling, and thus paid his bills.
We might never have heard of Robert H. Jackson, or at least we would
not be discussing him here, if he had stayed and become great only in New
York State—history would remember him, probably, as an eloquent judge of
the New York Court of Appeals, a position that Jackson came somewhat
close to attaining in the 1930s, but not as a national figure, much less as
someone who became significant on the international stage.
But Jackson also had, in addition to his legal skills and prosperity across
two decades in private law practice, an interest in politics. From his
upbringing through about 1921, he inherited and was involved with the
Andrew (no relation) Jacksonian Democratic Party politics of his father and
grandfather. In 1911, one of Robert Jackson’s attorney-mentors introduced
him, on a trip to Albany, to the new State Senator from Dutchess County,
Frank Roosevelt. He was about 28 and Robert Jackson was about 18. Less
than twenty years later, that Roosevelt had become F.D.R., and Jackson was
connected to Roosevelt as governor, as presidential candidate, and then in the
White House.
As President, Franklin Roosevelt nominated Robert H. Jackson, and the
Senate then confirmed those nominations, to five different offices: in 1934,
to be Assistant General Counsel in the Treasury Department’s Bureau of
Internal Revenue; in 1936, to be Assistant Attorney General, first heading the
Tax Division in the Department of Justice and then DOJ’s Antitrust Division;
in 1938, to be Solicitor General of the U.S., where he became a renowned
Supreme Court advocate; in 1940, to be Attorney General of the U.S.; and in
1941, to become an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.
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II. BARNETTE IN ITS SUPREME COURT CONTEXT: THE
JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES CASES, 1938–1943
I turn now to the Supreme Court’s decision in West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette, announced in June 1943. Although the Barnette
decision stands on its own, in its published words, it also was one of
numerous decisions that the Court handed down during a five-year period
regarding the constitutional rights of Jehovah’s Witnesses.4
This section locates Barnette within that range of decisions. I first
describe the Court’s Jehovah’s Witnesses decisions as they came down, in
three discernable phases. I then describe chronologically how the Court’s
membership changed significantly as it was handling and deciding these
cases.
A.

The General Pattern of the Decisions: The Court Warming to
Jehovah’s Witnesses’ Constitutional Claims

During 1940–43, the Supreme Court decided Jehovah’s Witnesses cases
in three distinct time periods. For the most part, the Court at first rejected the
Witnesses’ constitutional claims. Then it came to uphold them. Then it
upheld them by more than a bare majority vote.
1.

The Pre-July 1941 Court

The “first Court,” the pre-Summer 1941 Court on which Robert Jackson
was not yet a member, generally handed down decisions rejecting
constitutional claims by Jehovah’s Witnesses.
Yes, the Witnesses did not lose every time one of their cases made it to
the Supreme Court in these years. In 1938, for example, in Lovell v. City of
Griffin, the Court unanimously reversed a Witness’s conviction for violating
a city ordinance that prohibited unlicensed distribution of literature and
required would-be distributors to get the city manager’s permission to do so.5
In 1939, in Schneider v. New Jersey, the Court reversed three Witnesses’
criminal convictions for violating ordinances barring handbill distribution on

4 See generally SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, JUDGING JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: RELIGIOUS
PERSECUTION & THE DAWN OF THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2000).
5 303 U.S. 444 (1938). Earlier in the same term as Lovell, the Court had dismissed a Jehovah’s
Witness’s appeal that arose from a criminal prosecution, also in Griffin, Georgia. See Coleman v. City of
Griffin, 302 U.S. 636 (1937) (per curiam). It appears that Coleman is the first Supreme Court decision,
albeit a summary one, in a Jehovah’s Witness case. See DAVID R. MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CAESAR:
THE FLAG-SALUTE CONTROVERSY 27 (1962).
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public streets or door-to-door.6 And in May 1940, the Court in Cantwell v.
Connecticut, reversed criminal convictions of three Witnesses who had been
convicted for selling religious books without purchasing a government
license.7
But the Cantwell Court was the same one that, just a month later, in
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, held that the Constitution permitted a
public school to expel Jehovah’s Witness schoolchildren who refused to
salute the American flag.8
And this was nearly the same Court—Justice James C. McReynolds did
retire in the interim—that, in March 1941, nine months after Gobitis, upheld
in Cox v. New Hampshire, the criminal convictions of 68 Jehovah’s
Witnesses for violating a state law barring unlicensed parades on public
streets.9
During this period, Robert Jackson was Solicitor General and then
Attorney General of the United States, not a Supreme Court Justice. I am
aware of no evidence showing his reaction to Lovell, Schneider, Cantwell, or
Cox. When Gobitis was decided in June 1940, however, Attorney General
Jackson did disapprove, strongly, of its result, at least on the pragmatic
ground that it was increasing public unrest. Jackson in this time period
debated world security issues, and maybe even the Gobitis case, with his
friend Justice Felix Frankfurter—on June 1, at a small, private dinner that
Librarian of Congress Archibald MacLeish hosted at his Georgetown home,10
Jackson and Justice Frankfurter debated past midnight, and with “a good deal
of feeling,” the situation in Europe,11 and maybe related topics. Only two
days later, on Monday, June 3, Justice Frankfurter announced his opinion for
the Court in Gobitis. And on Friday, June 14, which happened to be Flag
Day, the presidentially proclaimed day to commemorate the Continental
Congress adopting on June 14, 1777, the Stars and Stripes as the official flag
of the U.S.,12 Attorney General Jackson told President Roosevelt and the
6

308 U.S. 147 (1939).

7

310 U.S. 296 (1940).

8

310 U.S. 586 (1940).

9

312 U.S. 569 (1941). One of the appellants in Cox was Walter Chaplinsky, soon to be subject of
the Court’s decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, upholding his criminal conviction for insulting a
police officer.
10 See Letter from Robert H. Jackson to Archibald MacLeish, May 9, 1940 (original) (accepting
his invitation to this dinner), in Archibald MacLeish Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division,
Washington, D.C., Box 3.
11 See HAROLD L. ICKES, III THE SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES: THE LOWERING CLOUDS,
1939-1941, at 198, 199 (1955) (diary notes concerning this dinner).
12 In 1916, President Wilson proclaimed the first Flag Day. Since then, every president has done
so annually. See, e.g., President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Proclamation No. 2586, 3 C.F.R. § 38-43 (1943).
In 1998, a law was enacted designating June 14 as Flag Day and asking the president each year to issue a
Flag Day proclamation. See 36 U.S.C.A. § 110 (West 1998).
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Cabinet of anti-alien, anti-”fifth columnist” hysteria that was sweeping the
country and expressed his particular bitterness about the Gobitis decision.13
2.

The July 1941–May 1943 Court

The “second Court,” which was the one that Jackson joined in July 1941,
evolved into a pro-Jehovah’s Witness Court.
Yes, the Witnesses at first continued to lose major cases before this
Court. In March 1942, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Court upheld,
unanimously, the criminal conviction of a Jehovah’s Witness street preacher
for speaking offensive, derisive, and annoying words.14 Walter Chaplinsky
had called a police officer “a God damned racketeer” and “a damned Fascist,”
and the Court held that such “fighting words” were not protected speech
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.15
And in Jones v. City of Opelika and its companion cases, decided in June
1942, this Court held that the Constitution permitted the city to require
Jehovah’s Witnesses to purchase licenses before they could distribute and
sometimes sell religious books, pamphlets, and other publications—this did
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections of speech, press, and
religious freedoms.16
But in a short period of time, this Court swung around. At first, more
Justices started to vote to uphold Jehovah’s Witnesses’ claims to
constitutional protection—while Gobitis in 1940 had been an 8-1 decision
against the Witnesses, Jones two years later was a much-closer 5-4 defeat for
the Witnesses. Three Justices—Hugo L. Black, William O. Douglas, and
Frank Murphy—not only began in Jones to vote in favor of Witnesses’
constitutional claims. These Justices, who had been part of the Gobitis supermajority, filed in Jones, gratuitously, an opinion recanting their votes to
uphold the flag salute.17
Then, in 1943, this Court began to decide cases consistently in favor of
the Witnesses’ claims to constitutional protection. In Murdock v.
Pennsylvania (City of Jeanette) and Martin v. City of Struthers, decided in
May 1943, the Court recognized, respectively, the Witnesses’ rights to
distribute books and pamphlets door-to-door without having to pay for a

13

See id. at 211 (diary notes concerning President Roosevelt’s June 14, 1940, Cabinet meeting).

14

315 U.S. 568 (1942).

15

See id. at 573.

16

See 316 U.S. 584 (1942). The companion cases were No. 280, Bowden v. Fort Smith, and No.
966, Jobin v. Arizona.
17

See id. at 623–24 (opinion of Black, Douglas, and Murphy, JJ.)

834

FIU Law Review

[Vol. 13:827

license, and to distribute, door-to-door, handbills containing religious
information.18
This Court also reconsidered Jones and its companion cases and decided
them the other way. The Court held that, in light of Murdock, it was
unconstitutional to enforce licensing ordinances against Witnesses who were
distributing or selling literature door-to-door.19
On this Court, Justice Jackson was a vote against the Jehovah’s
Witnesses. In 1942, he was part of the 5-4 majority in the initial Jones v. City
of Opelika decision—Jones I. And in 1943, when a majority of the Court
shifted in Murdock and Martin from Gobitis-decision-type hostility toward
Jehovah’s Witnesses to support for their constitutional claims, Jackson was
a dissenter . . .
3.

The June 1943 Court

. . . except in the case of West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette.
For purposes of this typology, the “third Court” was the Court that
decided Barnette. Barnette was its own category because, while the Court
majority there continued the pro-Jehovah’s Witnesses voting pattern of the
1942–43 term’s other Witness case decisions, this one was made by more
than a bare majority. Five Justices became six. The addition was the Justice
who Chief Justice Stone Harlan Fiske Stone assigned to write the Court’s
opinion: Robert H. Jackson.
B.

Some Particulars of Supreme Court Personnel, Cases, and
Decisions, From Gobitis (1940) to Barnette (1943)

As just outlined, the chronology of the Supreme Court deciding
Jehovah’s Witnesses cases that are direct preludes to Barnette began in June
1940 when the Court announced its Gobitis decision.
In Gobitis, the Court declared that it was constitutional for a public
school to expel Jehovah’s Witness schoolchildren who refused to salute the
American flag.20 The vote was 8-1. Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote the
Court’s opinion. He was joined by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes and

18 See Murdock v. Pennsylvania (City of Jeanette), 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). In a third case, Douglas v. City of Jeannette, that the Court heard and then
decided at the same as Murdock and Martin, the Court held unanimously that it lacked jurisdiction to
decide the appeal. See 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
19

See Jones v. City of Opelika (Jones II), 319 U.S. 103 (1943).

20

Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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Associate Justices James C. McReynolds, Owen J. Roberts, Hugo L. Black,
Stanley Reed, William O. Douglas, and Frank Murphy. Then-Associate
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone dissented alone.
Less than a year later, the Court’s membership changed significantly. In
January 1941, Justice McReynolds retired. That June, at the end of the
Court’s term, Chief Justice Hughes also retired. President Roosevelt then
“elevated” Justice Stone—the lone dissenter in Gobitis—to be the new Chief
Justice, and Roosevelt appointed Senator James F. Byrnes (D.-SC) to succeed
McReynolds and Attorney General Robert H. Jackson to succeed Stone as an
Associate Justice.
In the Court’s next term, the new Stone Court continued, at first, to
decide Jehovah’s Witnesses cases as the Hughes Court had decided Gobitis,
rejecting Witnesses’ claims to constitutional protection against government
regulation.
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Court defined a Witness
preacher’s street speech as unprotected “fighting words.”21
In Jones v. City of Opelika,22 from Alabama, together with companion
cases from Arkansas and Arizona, the Court upheld, by a narrow 5-4 vote,
the constitutionality of Witnesses’ criminal convictions for selling printed
matter without purchasing city-required licenses. In Jones—which in short
time came to be known as Jones I—Justice Reed wrote the Court’s opinion.23
He was joined by Justices Roberts and Frankfurter from the Gobitis majority
of two years earlier, and by the two new Justices, Byrnes and Jackson. But
Chief Justice Stone, still dissenting as he had, as an Associate Justice, in
Gobitis, was no longer alone—in this case, Stone was joined by Justices
Black, Douglas, and Murphy, who had cast anti-Jehovah’s Witnesses votes
in Gobitis.24 And in a separate opinion, those three Justices now explicitly
recanted their Gobitis votes to uphold the constitutionality of the flag salute.25
The 8-1 Gobitis Court thus had become a bare majority of 5-4.
Following this decision, during the Court’s 1942 summer recess, the
Jehovah’s Witnesses who were the losing parties in the Jones case filed
petitions seeking rehearing. They were supported by amici, including the
American Newspaper Publishers Association and the American Civil
Liberties Union, who urged the Court to recognize that Jehovah’s Witnesses’
constitutional rights were violated by government enforcement of both

21

315 U.S. 568 (1942).

22

316 U.S. 584 (1942).

23

See id. at 584–600.

24

See id. at 600–11 (opinion of Stone, C.J., joined by Black, Douglas, and Murphy, JJ.); see also
id. at 611–23 (Murphy, J., joined by Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
25

See id. at 623–24 (opinion of Black, Douglas, and Murphy, JJ.).
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licensing requirements on leafletting and by compelling schoolchildren to
salute the flag.26
On October 5, 1942, as the new Supreme Court term began, Justice
Byrnes resigned—he concluded his Court career after only one term. That
departure led, before the term was out, to the demise of the Jones decision
and to other Jehovah’s Witnesses’ victories in the Court, including in
Barnette.
A major legal development occurred in West Virginia on the day
following Byrnes’s retirement: the U.S. Supreme Court was effectively
overruled by an inferior court, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia.27 Two young public school students, Gathie and
Marie Barnett, had refused to salute and pledge allegiance to the American
flag as the state board of education required, because doing so would have
violated their beliefs as Jehovah’s Witnesses.28 Their school repeatedly sent
them home for their noncompliance and eventually it expelled them. Other
schools did the same to other children who were Witnesses and refusing to
salute the flag.
The Barnett girls’ father and two other adult plaintiffs filed a federal
class action lawsuit. They argued that the State policy violated the U.S.
Constitution and they sought an injunction. And in the District Court, the
three-judge panel held that Gobitis was no longer good law, because three of
the eight Justices who had been part of the Gobitis Court had recanted their
votes and a fourth had resigned.29 On the merits, the panel issued the
injunction. It held that the compulsory flag salute denied the plaintiffs’
fundamental rights of religious liberty.30
The West Virginia State Board of Education appealed this judgment to
the Supreme Court. On January 4, 1943, the Court—only eight Justices,
following Justice Byrnes’s resignation—noted its probable jurisdiction.31
A few days later, on January 11, 1943, the country learned who the new
ninth Justice would be. President Roosevelt nominated Justice Wiley
Rutledge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to become
an Associate Justice. The Senate confirmed the nomination swiftly and
Justice Rutledge received his commission on February 11, 1943.

26

See Publishers Urge Court Reversal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1942, at 21.

27

See Barnette v. West Virginia State Board of Education, 47 F. Supp. 251 (S.D.W.V. 1942).

28

See generally Gregory L. Peterson, E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., Shawn Francis Peters, Bennett
Boskey, Gathie Barnett Edmonds, Marie Barnett Snodgrass, & John Q. Barrett, Recollections of West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 755 (2007) [hereinafter
Recollections of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette].
29

See Barnette, 47 F. Supp. at 252–53.

30

Id. at 255.

31

See 63 S. Ct. 437 (1943); accord 1942 J. Sup. Ct. U.S. 110, 112 (1943).
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On the very next day, Friday, February 12, the Court began to hear oral
arguments in the first of that term’s many cases involving Jehovah’s
Witnesses. It was still an eight-Justice Court that heard argument that day
because Justice Rutledge, although commissioned, did not take his seat until
the following Monday, February 15.32
The February 12 argument cases, Jamison v. Texas and Largent v.
Texas, arose from arrests and prosecutions of Jehovah’s Witnesses for
leafletting and selling books door-to-door without the requisite licenses. The
Court decided these cases three weeks later, 8-0, with Justice Rutledge not
participating. In Jamison, the Court held that Fourteenth Amendment press
and free exercise rights applied to Jehovah’s Witnesses distributing handbills
on the streets even if the handbills contained some commercial information.33
In Largent, the Court held that the Jehovah’s Witnesses had a Fourteenth
Amendment right to sell books in the residential areas of Paris, Texas,
without getting from the mayor the permit which he had unrestricted
discretion to issue or withhold.34
On Monday, February 15, Justice Rutledge was present for the first time
on the Supreme Court bench. He thus was part of the Court that on that day,
back at full strength, granted the petition for rehearing in Jones and its
companion cases35—soon leading to the decision known as Jones II.
March 1943 was an even more significant month. On March 10 and 11,
the Court heard oral arguments in a raft of Jehovah’s Witnesses cases. In the
first, the high-profile re-argument of Jones, Jehovah’s Witnesses’ attorney
Hayden Covington argued unopposed—the City of Opelika did not, unlike
its approach in 1942 when the case first was argued (and it had won), send
an attorney to argue its side. Perhaps it knew that it was in trouble.
The Court also heard oral arguments that day in four other Jehovah’s
Witnesses cases: (1) Murdock v. Pennsylvania, arising from the city of
Jeannette, Pennsylvania; (2) Martin v. Struthers, arising from the city of
Struthers, Ohio; (3) Douglas v. City of Jeannette (also from Jeanette,
Pennsylvania); and (4) West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.
The Barnette case was, in other words, not a stand-alone event in the Supreme
Court.
On Saturday, March 13, the Justices met in conference to discuss and
decide these just-argued cases. In the main, they voted 5-4 in favor of the
Jehovah’s Witnesses. In Jones II, for example, Chief Justice Stone plus
32

1942 J. Sup. Ct. U.S. 153 (1943). Cf. JOHN M. FERREN, SALT OF THE EARTH, CONSCIENCE OF
221 (2004) (quoting the letter that Justice Rutledge
wrote from the Court to President Roosevelt on February 15, 1943).
THE COURT: THE STORY OF JUSTICE WILEY RUTLEDGE
33

318 U.S. 413 (1943).

34

318 U.S. 418 (1943).

35

See Jones v. City of Opelika, 318 U.S. 797 (1943).
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Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge voted for the Witnesses, the
opposite of what the Court had decided in Jones I the previous June. In
Murdock and Martin, the same Justices voted in favor of the Witnesses. In
Douglas, the Justices concluded they lacked jurisdiction. And in Barnette,
the vote was 6-3 in the Witnesses’ favor. This was the only case in which
Justice Jackson voted with the five “liberals”—he voted opposite them in
Jones II, Murdock, and Martin, and he joined them to overrule Gobitis.
Following the conference voting, Chief Justice Stone assigned Justice
Jackson to draft the opinion of the six-Justice Court in Barnette. Stone might
well have, with the assigning power of his position plus his history of having
been the lone dissenter in Gobitis, kept that assignment for himself. His
assignment, instead, to Jackson suggests the closeness of their relationship,
and perhaps a logical distribution of Court workload. It also indicates the
possible “softness” of Jackson’s vote in Barnette—he was, by voting pattern,
the least pro-Jehovah’s Witness member of the six-Justice Barnette majority,
so having him write the Court’s opinion upholding the Witnesses’
constitutional argument would mean, by definition, that he would be
comfortable with it. Bennett Boskey, Chief Justice Stone’s senior law clerk
at the time, recalled all of this vividly more than sixty years later:
Stone, having written the Gobitis case, would have been
overjoyed to be the author of the opinion in
the Barnette case. But he had better sense than that. He knew
that he had a new Justice in Jackson. He knew that if
Rutledge was given the opinion, he would write probably too
wide an opinion to hold the six votes together. [Stone] had
no hope that if Black, Douglas, or Murphy wrote the opinion,
it would be sufficiently, narrowly constructed to hold the six
votes together—it might lose Jackson. So we talked about it
some and [Stone] decided the best thing to do for the Court
to get an opinion which would be subscribed to by the
maximum number of Justices, which in this case would be
six, would be to assign the opinion to Jackson, whatever
chances that might involve taking. And that’s what he did.
And that’s how Jackson, who was a relatively junior Justice,
ended up as the author of this terribly important opinion.36
In April, while the Justices were drafting and circulating proposed
opinions in these cases, the Court heard oral arguments in an additional
cluster of Jehovah’s Witnesses cases. On April 15 and 16, the Court heard
argument in Taylor v. Mississippi, Benoit v. Mississippi, and Cummings v.
36 Recollections of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, supra note 28, at 784
(quoting Bennett Boskey).
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Mississippi.37 In the cases, the appellants claimed that their criminal
convictions for promoting refusal to salute the American flag violated the
Constitution. They argued, in other words, that they had constitutional rights
to teach and encourage refusal to salute the American flag—the substantive
issue that was pending in Barnette.
In May, the Court announced decisions in four of the pending cases.
First was its reconsideration of its decision of the previous June, Jones v. City
of Opelika. This time, in Jones II, the Court held 5-4 that the Jehovah’s
Witnesses had First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to leaflet without
obtaining municipal licenses.38 Justice Douglas read the Court’s brief per
curiam opinion, for himself, Chief Justice Stone, and Justices Black, Murphy,
and Rutledge.39 Justices Roberts, Reed, Frankfurter, and Jackson dissented.
The switch of Justice Rutledge for Justice Byrnes had flipped the Jones case.
Chief Justice Stone—or perhaps his law clerk Bennett Boskey, if he
initially drafted that per curiam opinion—had been prepared, at least at first,
to say explicitly that the Court’s personnel change had caused the change in
result from Jones I to Jones II. Stone had, back on March 25, circulated to
the other Justices a proposed Jones II per curiam opinion stating that “the
Court as now constituted is of opinion that the judgment in each case [i.e., in
Jones and its companion cases, and in Murdock and its companion cases]
should be reversed.”40 The candid words “as now constituted” startled Justice
Roberts (and maybe others). Roberts discussed his concerns with Justice
Douglas, who then reported them to the Chief Justice, who “readily agreed”
to delete those words.41 In the brief Jones II opinion that the Court handed
down on May 3, it rested its decision to reverse the Witnesses’ criminal
convictions on only its concurrent decision in Murdock, and on the dissenting
opinions that had been filed a year earlier in Jones I.42 It was nonetheless true,
if not stated explicitly, that the four Jones I dissenters now had, with Justice
Rutledge, the fifth vote that made the case come out the other way.
Justice Douglas, following his announcement of Jones II, then
announced his opinion for the Court in the Murdock case from Jeannette,
37

See 1942 J. Sup. Ct. U.S. 212–13 (1943); Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583, 584–85 (1943).

38

319 U.S. 103, 104 (1943).

39

See 1942 J. Sup. Ct. U.S. 222 (1943).

40

See Printed and circulated opinion, No. 280, Jones v. City of Opelika, No. 314, Bowden &
Sanders v. City of Fort Smith, and No. 966, Jobin v. Arizona, Mar. 25, 1943 (Justice Jackson’s copy,
received from Chief Justice Stone) (emphasis added), in Robert H. Jackson Papers, Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C., (“RHJL”), Box 127, Folder 1.
41 See Note from “WOD” [Justice Douglas] to “OJR” [Justice Roberts], “3/26” [Mar. 26, 1943]
(“I called the CJ about the suggested change in the per curiam in Jones v. Opelika. He readily agreed to
it[.]”), in WOD LOC, Box 89, Folder 9. Roberts wrote “Thanks!! OJR” on this note and sent it back to
Douglas. Id.
42

See Jones II, 319 U.S. at 104.
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Pennsylvania. The Court invalidated license requirements for selling books
and religious literature on public streets.43 The Justices again divided 5-4—
Stone, Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge voted for the Jehovah’s
Witnesses, and Roberts, Reed, Frankfurter, and Jackson dissented.
One other decision that the Court announced on May 3 was a big victory
for the Jehovah’s Witnesses. In Martin v. City of Struthers, the Court—the
same majority of five Justices—invalidated an ordinance outlawing door-todoor knocking and proselytizing throughout Struthers, Ohio.44
The Court’s final Jehovah’s Witness decision announced that day is the
one that you likely do not know: Douglas v. City of Jeannette. The Court held
9-0 that federal courts lacked equitable power to enjoin future state
enforcement of speaker licensing laws, such as those that the Court had, just
minutes earlier, held unconstitutional in Jones II. The Court held in Douglas
that because the danger of such enforcement was too speculative, the Court
in effect should abstain from deciding its constitutionality.45
With regard to Justice Jackson and Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Douglas
decision might be the most interesting. Jackson’s “big” 1942 term opinion
regarding Jehovah’s Witnesses arguably is Barnette, the 75th anniversary of
which brings us together. But that mantle also, arguably, fits the opinion that
he filed in Douglas.46
This Jackson opinion is literally hard to find. Its location in the reported
Douglas decision is topically incongruous, because Jackson’s opinion has
nothing to do with the Douglas case. In this respect, Jackson filing in Douglas
his very significant non-Douglas thoughts was a bit like Justices Black,
Douglas, and Murphy having filed in Jones I their recantation of their votes
in Gobitis—it had nothing to do with the issues of Jones II, except at the very
macro level of both cases involving Jehovah’s Witnesses. Yes, Jackson’s
opinion in Douglas noted his concurrence in that 9-0 result, that the Court
lacked jurisdiction. But much more importantly, the opinion was, as its odd
and complicated opening author and case identification states,47 his
substantive dissent in Murdock and in Martin, the 5-4 decisions of that day
which declared the constitutional rights of Jehovah’s Witnesses to sell books
and to preach door-to-door.
Jackson announced his Douglas “dissenting” opinion, really his
dissenting opinion in Murdock and Martin, six weeks before he announced
43

319 U.S. 105 (1943).

44

319 U.S. 141 (1943).

45

Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943).

46

See 319 U.S. at 166–82 (Jackson, J., joined by Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result &
dissenting in Murdock v. Pennsylvania and Martin v. City of Struthers).
47 See id. at 166 (“Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in the result in this case and dissenting in Nos.
480-487, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, ante, p. 105, and No. 238, Martin v. Struthers, ante, p. 141.”).
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his opinion for the Court in Barnette. The reason for that gap in time was
simple: the Justices had finished writing their Murdock, Martin, and Douglas
opinions while they were still working on their draft opinions in Barnette.
The gap between the decision announcements meant that Douglas, decided
first, got noticed in its moment, and that it soon was overshadowed, and in
the decades since then it has been overshadowed, by the later decision, which
is to say Barnette.
During the time gap between the Murdock, Martin, and Douglas
decisions on May 3 and Barnette on June 14, the Court heard oral arguments
in Busey v. District of Columbia, another Jehovah’s Witness case. At issue
was the constitutionality of a D.C. code provision requiring magazine-sellers
such as Jehovah’s Witnesses to procure a government license and pay a
license tax. This law was the federal equivalent of the Alabama law that the
Court had considered in Jones v. City of Opelika. In Busey, the lower court,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, had in April 1942
upheld, based on Jones I, the federal law’s constitutionality.48 Justice Wiley
Rutledge, then serving on the Court of Appeals, dissented from the Busey
panel’s 2-1 decision. By June 1, 1943, when Busey was argued in the U.S.
Supreme Court, Rutledge had become an Associate Justice there, so he
recused himself—the case was argued to an eight-Justice Court. And because
the Court by that time had reheard Jones v. Opelika and held in Jones II that
the Alabama law was unconstitutional, it seemed clear that the federal law’s
days were numbered as well.
And then came Monday, June 14. In the Court’s session that day, Justice
Jackson announced the decision in West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette.49 The Court, by a 6-3 vote, reversed its Gobitis decision
upholding the constitutionality of the school-required American flag salute
and Pledge of Allegiance. Jehovah’s Witness schoolchildren, Supreme Court
losers three years earlier, now were paragons of following conscience as
protected by the U.S. Constitution, even as they refused to join in national
rituals of patriotism and unity. Jackson still felt what he had voiced in
President Roosevelt’s Cabinet three years earlier, to the date: flag salute
policies that divide people and cause majority hysteria and violence against
Jehovah’s Witnesses should not be enforced. In that wartime moment,
Jackson abjured the idea that governments in the U.S. could compel Naziresembling salutes.50 He explained that the case concerned “the asserted
[government] power to force an American citizen publicly to profess any

48

Busey v. District of Columbia, 129 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
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319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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See id. at 627–28.
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statement of belief, or to engage in any ceremony of assent to one . . . ”51 He
declared that the Constitution grants no such power:
[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion, or force citizens to confess by word or
act their faith therein.52
In the United States, the date on which the Supreme Court announced
Barnette, June 14, 1943, also was “Flag Day.”53 But it seems that the timing
of the Court announcing Barnette on Flag Day was nothing that the Justices
did deliberately or even noticed. To my knowledge, no evidence, including
in any Justice’s archived papers, suggests that the Court timed its
announcement of Barnette to occur on Flag Day, to explain extra-powerfully,
with the holiday as the decision’s backdrop (and then, going forward, its
anniversary), the unconstitutionality of government compelling persons to
salute and to pledge allegiance to the American flag. It seems that the
decision came down on that day simply because it was the next Supreme
Court “decision day” that followed Justice Frankfurter completing, on
Friday, June 11, 1943, his dissenting opinion in Barnette.54
One indication that Justice Jackson in particular was oblivious to the
symbolism of deciding Barnette on Flag Day is a note that he penned to his
law clerk, John Costelloe. On Saturday morning, June 12, 1943, Jackson
asked Costelloe to review a couple of paragraphs that Jackson, after receiving
and reading Justice Frankfurter’s draft dissent, had drafted as additions to his
opinion for the Barnette Court. Jackson wrote:

51

Id. at 634.

52

Id. at 642.

53

See supra note 12.

54

See Typed Diary entries of Felix Frankfurter, June 10, 1943 (“Worked until 2:00 a.m. on Flag
Salute case.”), and June 11, 1943 (“Work on Flag Salute case.”), in Felix Frankfurter Papers, Library of
Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C., Box 2. He provided his proposed opinion to his fellow
Justices the next morning, before they met together in Conference and discussed the case for a final time.
See Pencil note, no author identified [it was Jackson’s secretary Ruth M. Sternberg], no date (“Diss. Opn
of F.F. rec’d 6-12-43 am”), in RHJL Box 127, Folder 10.
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Johnny Here are two inserts I
plan to put in [No.] 591[, Barnette].
Look them over and I
will drop in [your room to talk] at lunch.
This stuff goes
Monday.
RHJ55
Note Jackson’s workman-like use of “Monday”—June 14 was the next
decision day, so it would be the day to get this decision out the door.
On that day, the Court announced, in addition to Barnette, two other
decisions in Jehovah’s Witnesses cases. In Taylor v. Mississippi and its two
companion cases, the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Roberts, held
unanimously that the Constitution bars a State from punishing persons who
advise and urge others not to salute the flag.56 In other words, given every
person’s constitutional right, explained by Justice Jackson for the Court
moments earlier in Barnette, to refuse to obey State compulsion to salute the
American flag, a State may not punish someone for teaching and urging
exercise of that Barnette right.57 And in Busey v. District of Columbia, the
case regarding the constitutionality of the federal requirement that would-be
magazine-sellers must purchase licenses, the Court decided 8-0, per curiam,
to vacate the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ criminal convictions and remand the cases
for reexamination in light of Jones II and Murdock.58
On June 21, 1943, the Supreme Court recessed for the summer. It had,
in the just-completed term, heard arguments and announced decisions in
three distinct, important groups of cases involving the rights of Jehovah’s
Witnesses. In nine decisions—a pair, Largent and Jamison, on March 8; four
more, Jones II, Murdock, Martin, and Douglas, on May 3; and a final trio,
Barnette, Taylor, and Busey, on June 14—the Court upheld Witnesses’
claims that the Constitution protected their unlicensed selling of books for
religious purposes (Largent), unlicensed distribution of handbills on public

55 Note from Justice Robert H. Jackson to John F. Costelloe, no date [June 12, 1943], in RHJL
Box 127, Folder 10.
56

319 U.S. 583 (1943).
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See id. at 589 (“The statute here in question seeks to punish as criminal one who teaches
resistance to government compulsion to salute [the American flag]. If the Fourteenth Amendment bans
enforcement of the school regulation, a fortiori it prohibits the imposition of punishment for urging and
advising that, on religious grounds, citizens refrain from saluting the flag. If the state cannot constrain one
to violate his conscientious religious conviction by saluting the national emblem, then certainly it cannot
punish him for imparting his views on the subject to his fellows and exhorting them to accept those
views.”).
58

See 319 U.S. 579 (1943) (per curiam).
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streets (Jamison), unlicensed door-to-door sales of books for religious
purposes (Jones II), unlicensed door-to-door sales of religious handbills
(Murdock and Martin), refusals to salute the American flag or participate in
the Pledge of Allegiance (Barnette), promoting refusal to salute the flag
(Taylor), and unlicensed sale of magazines on public sidewalks (Busey).
The Witnesses’ only non-victory was Douglas, where the Court found
that it lacked jurisdiction to consider their claim.
III. JUSTICE JACKSON ON JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: THE AUTHOR
OF BARNETTE WROTE FIRST, AND SIGNIFICANTLY, IN
DOUGLAS
The Justice Jackson who wrote for the Court in Barnette also was the
Justice Jackson who wrote for himself, mostly dissenting, just six weeks
earlier, in Douglas.59 His separate opinion in Douglas was an important, and
maybe the central, part of his 1943 adjudication of Jehovah’s Witnesses’
constitutional claims.
In Douglas, Justice Jackson dug deeply into the record regarding the
conduct that led to the arrests, prosecutions, and convictions that the
Jehovah’s Witnesses were challenging in Murdock and Martin. Jackson
explained that, to him, the facts were very important to resolving the
constitutional arguments.60 And so he recounted in detail, in more than eight
pages in the United States Reports,61 exactly what the Jehovah’s Witnesses
stood for and what they had done.
I recount these facts here meaning no disrespect to Jehovah’s Witnesses
today. They include my friend Marie Barnett Snodgrass, who as a child was
a winning litigant in Barnette. In adulthood, she is a very kind and admirable
person, as was her late sister Gathie Barnett Edmonds.
In 1943, reviewing the record of Barnette, Justice Jackson plainly saw
the Barnetts as impressive schoolchildren of conscience who were protected
by the Constitution and deserving of judicial support. But, by contrast, he
emphasized in his Douglas opinion that, based on Jehovah’s Witnesses’
literature and the factual records in the Murdock and Martin cases, he saw
the adult Witnesses who had gotten arrested in Jeanette, Pennsylvania, in
59 See Douglas, 319 U.S. at 166 (Jackson, J., joined by Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result &
dissenting in Murdock v. Pennsylvania and Martin v. City of Struthers).
60 See id. at 166–67 (“The facts of record in the Douglas case and their relation to the facts of the
other cases seem to me worth recital and consideration if we are realistically to weigh the conflicting
claims of rights in the related cases today decided.”). See generally Jay S. Bybee, Common Ground:
Robert Jackson, Antonin Scalia, and a Power Theory of the First Amendment, 75 TULANE L. REV. 251,
273–75 (2000) (discussing Jackson’s Douglas dissent).
61

See id. at 167–75.
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April 1939 (the Murdock case defendants) and in Struthers, Ohio, in July
1940 (the Martin case defendants) as unsought, invasive, annoying,
bothersome, pestering proselytizers who had verbally assaulted persons in
what should have been the repose of home life.
Jackson highlighted the provocative, insulting content he found in
Jehovah’s Witnesses’ literature. He quoted from John Franklin Rutherford,
then the Witnesses’ leader, who was the author of material that they produced
and distributed. In Rutherford’s book Enemies,62 he had written that:
•
•

•
•

•

•

“The greatest racket ever invented and practiced is that
of religion.”;
“There are numerous systems of religion, but the most
subtle, fraudulent and injurious to humankind is that
which is generally labeled the ‘Christian religion,’
because it has the appearance of a worshipful devotion
to the Supreme Being, and thereby easily misleads many
honest and sincere persons.”;
The Roman Catholic hierarchy is “the great racket, a
racket that is greater than all other rackets combined.”;
“Referring now to the foregoing Scriptural definition of
harlot: What religious system exactly fits the prophecies
recorded in God’s Word? There is but one answer, and
that is, The Roman Catholic Church organization.”;
“Jewish and Protestant clergy and other allies of the
[Roman Catholic Church] Hierarchy … tag along behind
the Hierarchy at the present time to do the bidding of the
old ‘whore’.”; and
“Says the prophet of Jehovah: ‘It shall come to pass in
that day, that Tyre (modern Tyre, the Roman Catholic
Hierarchy organization) shall be forgotten.’ Forgotten
by whom? By her former illicit paramours who have
committed fornication with her.”

Jackson also quoted another Rutherford book, Religion.63 In it, he:
•

encouraged Witnesses to “set up their phonographs
before the doors and windows and send the message of
the kingdom right into the houses into the ears of those
who might wish to hear; and while those desiring to hear
are hearing, some of the ‘sourpusses’ are compelled to
hear.”;

62

See id. at 171 et seq.

63

See id. at 172 et seq.
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urged Witnesses to be like locusts: “Locusts invade the
homes of the people and even eat the varnish off the
wood and eat the wood to some extent. Likewise God’s
faithful witnesses, likened unto locusts, get the kingdom
message right into the house and they take the veneer off
the religious things that are in that house, including
candles and ‘holy water’, remove the superstition from
the minds of the people, and show them that the
doctrines that have been taught to them are wood, hay
and stubble, destructible by fire, and they cannot
withstand the heat.”; and
attacked Catholic Church teaching: “‘[P]urgatory’ is a
bogeyman, set up by the agents of Satan to frighten the
people into the religious organizations, where they may
be fleeced of their hard-earned money.”

Jackson also described the facts contained in the sparse record of the
Murdock case. In Jeanette, Pennsylvania, on April 2 (Palm Sunday), 1939,
over 100 Jehovah’s Witnesses rang doorbells or knocked on the doors of
every home. The Witnesses stood in the doorways. Homeowners and tenants
who answered were subjected to phonographic records blaring anti-religious
messages, such as:
•
•

“Religion is wrong and a snare because it deceives the
people”; and
“Religion is a racket because it has long been used and
is still used to extract money from the people.”64

In Martin, which concerned events in Struthers, Ohio, Jehovah’s
Witnesses also had knocked on doors on a Sunday afternoon, July 7, 1940.
Residents who tried to rebuff them were not respected. A mother who refused
to take a Witness’s handbill into her home was told that she was “doomed to
go to hell because [she] would not let this literature into [her] home for [her]
children to read.”65
To Justice Jackson, all of these words in their contexts were what the
unanimous Court had, just one year earlier in Chaplinsky, another Jehovah’s
Witness case, called “fighting words” that are not protected by the
Constitution.66 Jackson, in this portion of his Douglas opinion, thought that
64

Id. at 167.

65

Id. at 173.

66

See id. at 180 (“Neither can I think it is an essential part of freedom that religious differences
be aired in language that is obscene, abusive, or inciting to retaliation. We have held that a Jehovah’s
Witness may not call a public officer a ‘God damned racketeer’ and a ‘damned Fascist,’ because that is to
use ‘fighting words,’ and such are not privileged.”) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 569 (1942)).
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his five brethren in the majority had ignored facts that should have been
decisive.
Justice Jackson also considered, in addition to the facts of the Witnesses’
behavior, the facts of lives they had affected. Jackson wrote, in an
interestingly self-exposing statement, that the Witnesses were able to come
into direct contact with people who were not insulated by wealth and
privilege. In a footnote, he quoted Harvard Law School Professor and free
speech expert Zechariah Chafee, Jr., who had “wonder[ed] whether the
Justices of the Supreme Court are quite aware of the effect of organized frontdoor intrusions upon people who are not sheltered from zealots and imposters
by a staff of servants or the locked entrance of an apartment house.”67
When Jackson wrote that, he was living at his Hickory Hill home in
rural, isolated McLean, Virginia. Most of his Court colleagues, by contrast,
lived in Washington, D.C., homes or apartments where they did not answer
their own doors and risk encountering proselytizers. But that was a fact of
typical life in communities like Jeanette and Struthers.
Jackson also reproduced, in his Douglas opinion footnotes, census data
showing how many Roman Catholics lived in those communities, and how
many people were factory laborers who worked night shifts and needed to
sleep during the day.68 He used these facts to assess the real intrusiveness of
hearing the doorbell or the knock, answering the door, and then hearing the
hectoring words of proselytizers.
Jackson thus announced in his Douglas opinion that he was dissenting
in Murdock and Martin because the Court had not properly balanced the
Jehovah’s Witnesses’ claims against the harms they had caused to persons in
their homes and communities. He accused the Court of offering, casually,
absolutist descriptions of rights that were not germane to what the cases really
involved. He urged instead an approach that considered the force of the
Jehovah’s Witnesses’ press, religious, and speech rights claims against their
impacts on unwilling audiences:
Our difference of opinion [with the Court] cannot fairly be
given the color of a disagreement as to whether the
constitutional rights of Jehovah’s Witnesses should be
protected insofar as they are rights. These Witnesses, in
common with all others, have extensive rights to proselyte
and propagandize. These of course include the right to
oppose and criticize the Roman Catholic Church or any other
denomination. These rights are, and should be held to be, as

67 Douglas, 319 U.S. at 175 n.3. (Jackson, J., joined by Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result &
dissenting in Murdock v. Pennsylvania and Martin v. City of Struthers).
68

See id. at 167 n.1.
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extensive as any orderly society can tolerate in religious
disputation. The real question is where their rights end and
the rights of others begin. The real task of determining the
extent of their rights on balance with the rights of others is
not meant met by pronouncement of general propositions
with which there is no disagreement.
If we should strip these cases to the underlying questions, I
find them too difficult as constitutional problems to be
disposed of by a vague but fervent transcendentalism.69
A final, notable dimension of Justice Jackson’s Douglas opinion was his
focus on the limits of judicial power. In his view, the Court should exercise
power pragmatically, carefully, and at the level of the questions that cases
really concern. That is where judging will connect with existing or probable
public consensus and support. That is where a Court can teach and be obeyed
and, by those measures, succeed. And, concomitantly, the Court should not
make too-abstract decisions that will put it too far from real connection to the
people.
Here is how Jackson explained his view:
In these cases, local authorities caught between the offended
householders and the drive of the Witnesses, have been hard
put to keep the peace of their communities. They have
invoked old ordinances that are crude and clumsy for the
purpose. I should think the singular persistence of the
turmoil about Jehovah’s Witnesses, one which seems to
result from the work of no other sect, would suggest to this
Court a thorough examination of their methods to see if they
impinge unduly on the rights others. Instead of that the Court
has, in one way after another, tied the hands of all local
authority and made the aggressive methods of this group the
law of the land.
This Court is forever adding new stories to the temples of
constitutional law, and the temples have a way of collapsing
when one story too many is added.70
Justice Jackson read his Douglas dissent from the bench on May 3,
1943, immediately after Chief Justice Stone had read his opinion for the
Court in that case.71 Earlier in that Court session, Justice Douglas had read
69

319 U.S. at 178–79.

70

Id. at 181.

71

1942 J. Sup. Ct. U.S. 221, 223 (1943).
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the Court’s per curiam opinion in Jones II,72 and then his opinion for the
Court in Murdock,73 and Justice Black had read his opinion for the Court in
Martin.74 Only then did Jackson, by reading his Douglas opinion explaining
his dissenting votes in Murdock and Martin, let the majority “have it.”
Jackson’s fellow dissenters knew what was coming from him. While
others, probably Chief Justice Stone, were reading their opinions for the
Court, Justice Roberts passed a note to Jackson: “Give ‘em hell! I’m getting
hotter + hotter!”75 And when Jackson was done reading, Roberts passed him
a second note: “You gave ‘em hell! Please accept this acknowledgement of
my obligation[.]”76
If Jackson sent any notes back to Roberts, it seems that they have not
survived. But Jackson also exchanged notes with Justice Frankfurter while
they were on the bench, after Jackson had read his Douglas dissent, and these
Frankfurter notes are preserved in Jackson’s papers.
It seems that Jackson, after he finished reading, wrote to Frankfurter to
explain his decision to do so. It seems that Jackson decided on the bench, as
the day’s proceedings were occurring, to read his Douglas dissenting opinion
rather than just to release it in print. Jackson explained that he had watched
how closely the well-informed, thoughtful people who comprised the
courtroom audience were listening to other Justices reading their proJehovah’s Witnesses opinions for the Court. This caused Jackson to decide
to read his dissenting views to those listeners.
Justice Frankfurter responded to Jackson’s explanation by penning a
multi-page note of agreement. Frankfurter passed this note to Jackson,
probably by handing it to a messenger for delivery rather than having the five
Justices who sat on the bench between them pass it one to the next:
I wholly agree with
you, and [it was] precisely
because my estimate of the audience
was the same as
yours that I
deemed your full
delivery so important.
72

See id. at 222.

73

See id.

74

See id. at 223.

75

Note from “OJR” [Justice Owen J. Roberts], one sheet of Supreme Court of the United States
Memorandum pad paper, in RHJL Box 127, Folder 6.
76 Note from “OJR” [Justice Owen J. Roberts], one sheet of Supreme Court of the United States
Memorandum pad paper, in RHJL Box 127, Folder 6.
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By this time [in my judicial career]
I can feel the
emanations of
an audience
when it was
as clear[,] deep
and uniform as [what]
I’d bet my
right hand
was the judgment
of what you
rightly call an
informed + critically
qualified body.77
Jackson also must have written his concern that he had spoken too long.
Frankfurter responded to this by penning a second, pun-filled note of
disagreement and passing it to Jackson:
As my God is
my witness –
it was not too
long. Really, I
would not, if I
had been empowered,
have omitted a
single minute of your delivery.
FF
P.S.
Some things are
important –
+ these Jehovah
cases were of that
importance which
called for “testifying.”
FF78

77 Note from “FF” [Justice Felix Frankfurter], four sheets of Supreme Court of the United States
Memorandum pad paper, in RHJL Box 127, Folder 6.
78 Note from “FF” [Justice Felix Frankfurter], two sheets of Supreme Court of the United States
Memorandum pad paper (emphases in original), in RHJL Box 127, Folder 6.
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IV. CONCLUSION: SOME LIFE ROOTS OF JUSTICE JACKSON’S
VIEWS ON JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES AND OTHERS
I will finish where I began, on a few biographical dimensions of Robert
H. Jackson. These are ones that seem to connect to the votes he cast as a
Supreme Court Justice and the opinions he wrote in the Jehovah’s Witnesses
cases.
Jackson knew of religious variety and small, non-conforming sects from
western Pennsylvania and western New York State—his boyhood landscape
was filled with iconoclastic, idiosyncratic practices and beliefs. Joseph Smith
discovered the Mormon faith, and then encountered persecution and began
his trek, in western New York. Spiritualist and transcendentalist movements
flourished at times near Frewsburg, where Jackson grew up. Kiantone
movement adherents, for example, lived during the 19th century in nearby
woods, and Jackson as a boy and later studied them and explored that site.
Lily Dale, located like Frewsburg in Chautauqua County, was a spiritualist
community and is to this day. In 1910, as Jackson was graduating from
Jamestown High School, over 5,000 Bible students—later they came to be
called Jehovah’s Witnesses—met in Celoron, New York, adjacent to
Jamestown at the foot of Chautauqua Lake, for a nine-day convention. In
these direct senses, Jackson knew Jehovah’s Witnesses and people like them,
and people unlike them, long before he became a judge.
Jackson also knew the experience, from youth forward, of being outside
the mainstream of unorthodox belief. He and his family were Democrats, a
political minority in their places and times. They also were not churchgoers,
unlike most of their neighbors—the Jacksons had a Bible in the house and
some religious beliefs, but they were generally agnostic tending toward
atheism. And what they experienced from their neighbors and in their
communities was live-and-let-live tolerance.
Robert Jackson had also direct experiences, which he remembered with
chagrin, of acting intolerantly, ignorantly, toward people whose faiths
differed from his own. On one boyhood occasion, when Robert, repeating
ugliness that he had heard from some bigot, criticized Catholicism to an Irish
girl who was working for his family, he was overheard by his mother and he
got spanked. On another occasion, when Jackson, early in high school,
attended a religious revival meeting and, with friends, behaved
disrespectfully and annoyed the crowd, his father heard about it and cussed
Robert out. He was raised not only to be idiosyncratic, but also to show
respect for the unique beliefs of others.
Jackson also remembered an experience of dealing with a preacher at
the door. It involved both toleration and control of one’s domain. Robert was
about age 12, home with his grandfather and baby sister. A fiery preacher
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came to call. This predated the screen door, so the opened door meant
unmediated contact. The preacher asked to pray for the grandfather’s soul.
The old man, not much of a believer, said yes—but he also asked the preacher
to keep it down, so as not to wake the baby.
I do not think that it is stretching too far to see in these Jackson life
moments some roots of the pragmatism, the balancing, the legal nondoctrinalism, and the inclination to value every individual’s space and peace
that one finds in his Douglas and Barnette opinions, a connected pair
concerning where and the how the Constitution protects both Jehovah’s
Witnesses and others.

